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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA -A CRITIQUE"
Phenyo Keiseng Rakate*
"Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made"
Emmanuel Kant'
INTRODUCTION
"Never again!" was the message that characterised the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Military Tribunals responsible for prosecuting Nazi war criminals after the Second
World War. Fifty years after Nuremberg, a bloody civil war broke out in the former
Yugoslavia claiming the lives of thousands of ordinary civilians, especially women
and children. In December 1995 the Dayton Peace Accord was signed by the warring
parties in the Balkans purportedly with the message "never again will the horror of
Bosnia be repeated." Three years later the horror of Bosnia is repeating itself in
Kosovo. During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda it is estimated that between 500 and 1
Million or more people were killed in a period of three months. The genocide in
Rwanda occurred after the failure of the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord.
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 Paraphrased by Isaiah Berlin "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Four Essays on Liberty (1969) 170.
When a country emerges from a period in which there have been human rights
abuses one of the questions that arises is how to deal with the past. In this regard
there are two broad approaches:
(i) First, an approach based on retributive justice, that is, to punish
perpetrators of human rights abuses through criminal trials; or
(ii) Second, an approach based on restorative justice, that is, reconciliation
and amnesty through a truth-telling process.
Which approach is adopted will depend on the nature of the transition.
Nevertheless, this paper compare the United Nations ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), because the ICTY adopts the first approach
(retributive justice) and the TRC the second approach (restorative justice). The
question then is: which is the better approach? The underlying theme of the paper is to
evaluate the prons and cons of truth-telling and prosecution as forms of transitional
justice in South Africa and the Balkans and the lessons to be learned therefrom.
As we approach the end of the millennium, many societies are confronted with the
challenge of transition to democratic rule. The consequences of South Africa's
negotiated settlement was a peaceful transition from a minority to majority rule. Why
a comparison of South Africa and the former Yugoslavia? Apartheid in South Africa
and genocide in the Balkans constitute crimes against humanity. Moreover, attempts
to create international criminal tribunals for South Africa2 and the former Yugoslavia3
to prosecute for crimes committed in both countries did not succeed.
Although a considerable amount of comparative research about truth commissions
has been conducted, little research has apparently been undertaken on the relationship
between domestic truth commissions and the international criminal justice system.4
However, this may be attributed to the fact that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military
Tribunals, unlike the ICTY, have been criticised for administering "victor's justice." It
is estimated that since 1974 there have been nearly twenty truth commissions.5
However, it is important to note that each truth commission is situation specific, and
the South African Truth Commission is no exception.
On 29 October 1998 the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
handed a Final Report to the President, Nelson Mandela, in which it found all the
parties involved in the conflict responsible for gross human rights violations between
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1960 and 1994.' The Amnesty Committee of the TRC will continue to hear amnesty
applications of perpetrators of gross human rights violations until 1999. The progress
of the South African Truth Commission is probably one of the success stories of
domestic truth commissions. Unlike truth commissions in Latin American countries,
the TRC has the power to grant amnesty and to subpoena witnesses to appear before
the Commission. Its victim-hearing process has been larger than that of any other truth
commission and has benefited from the input from civil society through institutional
hearings.1 Although considerable progress has been made there is still room for
improvement on the South African model for any society in transition which may opt
for a truth commission in future. For example, in 1998 political parties in Guatemala
decided to create a Commission for Historical Clarifications to deal with the legacy of
the past after a civil war.8 These developments have made some scholars suggest that
the creation of a permanent international truth commission would be a good idea.9
I. The Meaning of Transition in South Africa and the Former Yugoslavia
Andrea Bonime-Blanc10 defines "transition" as referring to "a period of
reformist change between regimes - not to a change of government within the same
constitutional framework nor to a revolutionary transformation." Each transition is
unique and depends on the socio-political dynamics of each society; hence it would be
* See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (1998), Vol. 1, Ch. 1. para 24.
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unscholarly to have a general theory of transition to democratic rule. In this paper it is
argued that South Africa is in transition after the demise of apartheid, and the former
Yugoslavia is in a transitional phase after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. It
may well be argued that Yugoslavia is not a society in transition, since there was no
change of government after the disintegration of the federation in 1991. The Balkan
crisis, in my view, is one example of a case where a society could not "manage" or
"accommodate" its transition from communism to democratic rule. Despite the
Dayton Peace Accord and the existence of the ICTY, the war between Serbian forces
and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) led by ethnic Albanians continues in the
Serbian Province of Kosovo. Political leaders of the now independent republics of
Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosovic of Serbia-Montenegro, President Franjo Tudjman of
Croatia and President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, are still leaders in
their respective republics. It may be argued that this in itself would make it difficult
to refer to the former Yugoslavia as a transitional society. However, I believe that to
the extent that the existence of the ICTY is geared towards bringing peace and
justice in a post-war era, the former Yugoslavia is in a transitional phase.
II. Responses Towards Human Rights Violations in Transitional Societies
An intractable problem common to societies in transition is how to reckon with
the legacy of the past and pave the way for a new era. Dealing with past human
rights violations is indeed a daunting and challenging exercise for any nascent
democracy. This challenge is characterised by conflicting interests and
considerations. Should perpetrators of gross human rights violations be subjected
to prosecution, or given amnesty? What is the optimal way of achieving justice for
victims of human rights violations, and due process for perpetrators? How does one
balance reconciliation and the reconstruction of society? How will this impact on
stability and peace? Facing this challenge involves making hard choices between
blanket and conditional amnesty, and between prosecution and reparations; choices
recognising the need to create a culture of human rights as opposed to a culture of
impunity. Choices must be made between vengeance and peaceful co-existence,
between retribution and restorative justice, between fears and legitimate
expectations, and often these decisions have a direct impact on competing needs,
with limited resources available. These factors play a major role in fragile
democracies.
Transition from an authoritarian to a democratic form of government is a
difficult exercise for any society. The dilemmas of transitional justice are complex and
vary from one country to another. In the words of Neil Kritz, "[t]hese issues of
transitional justice are highly charged flashpoints in many countries emerging from
repression, with societal wounds still open and in need of treatment.""
Is there an appropriate model for dealing with a bitter past? What is the
optimal way of achieving justice within the context of transition? Why should a
democratic government deal with past human rights violations? Luis Aquirre12 says:
"To answer these questions we need a social and political map, a factual
history, and the answers to our "why?." It is, therefore, essential to know
what happened, how people acted during this particular period in history,
" Neil Keitz (ed) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes
(Country Studies) (vol. 2) xxx.
1
 Luis Aquine "The Consequences of Impunity in Society" International Meeting on Impunity of
Perpetrators of Gross Human Rights Violations organised by the Common Nationale Consultative,
Des Droits de V Homme and the Internationale Commission of Jurists, held under the auspices of
the United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 2-5 November 1992 at 107.
how some tried to resist, how the people were subdued, how rights were
violated, by whom, when, where and why, and to know how we managed
essentially to escape the nightmare. In short, it is necessary to hold onto this
sad but very important story so that we may leam a lesson, draw conclusions,
be able to look into each other's eyes without shame, and move towards the
future."
The end goals of transitional justice in general should be to prevent similar
recurrence of human rights violations in future; to repair the damage caused through
systematic patterns of human rights violations; to uphold the rule of law; to recognise
the human dignity and worth of those who have been victimised by conflicts and to
create a stable and governable political environment."
In most cases, new governments have limited choices in dealing with past
human rights violations - they may either punish those responsible for heinous
crimes, or grant them amnesty.14 Is there a single method for dealing with the past?
There are two methods commonly adopted by societies in transition. First, there is an
official mechanism in the form of a Truth Commission." The main purpose of such a
commission is to investigate the truth, within a limited space of time, about past
human rights violations and to issue a comprehensive official report about its findings
and recommendations.16 The second is to prosecute those responsible for past human
13
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to promote national reconciliation, and to obtain or sustain political legitimacy").
"Priscilla Hayner, Ibid ("...[A] truth commission includes four primary elements. First, a truth
commission focuses on the past. Second, a truth commission is not focused on a specific event, but
rights violations. Such an option could take the form of a domestic prosecution or an
ad hoc Criminal Tribunal." The main function of such a tribunal would be to
prosecute those alleged to have committed gross human rights violations. It is
important to distinguish modern criminal tribunals and truth commissions from some
of the highly abusive post- transition tribunals in which their purpose was to kill and
instil terror in the representatives of old regimes, such as ad hoc military tribunals.
Failure on the part of a new government to deal with past human rights
violations often has drastic consequences for the birth of the new society. It is
important for a society to reconcile itself with its past. A society which deliberately
ignores its past human rights violations is sitting on a bomb which may go off at any
time. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda is an example of what could happen to a society
which ignores its past.'8 As Archbishop Desmond Tutu, chairperson of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission puts it:
"[Experience worldwide shows that if you do not deal with a dark past such
as ours, effectively look the beast in the eye, that beast is not going to lie down
quietly, it is going as sure as anything, to come back and haunt you
horrendously.""
attempts to paint the overall picture of certain human rights abuses, or violations of international
humanitarian law, over a period of time. Third, a truth commission usually exists temporarily and for a
pre-defined period of time, ceasing to exist with the submission of a report of its findings. Finally a
truth commission is always vested with some sort of authority, by way of its sponsor, that allows it
greater access to information, greater security or protection to dig into sensitive issues, and a greater
impact with its report").
"Examples of international criminal tribunals include the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg
and Tokyo and more recently the two UN ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).
"Gerard Prunier The Rwanda Crises: History of a Genocide (1997) Ch. 5.
"Cited in Richard Goldstone "Justice as a Tool for Peacemaking: Truth Commissions and Internationa
Criminal Tribunals" Hauser Lecture, New York University, 22 January 1997 (on file with the author).
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In a similar vein, Jose Zolaquett is of the opinion that "... leaders should
never forget that the lack of political pressure to [ raise ] these issues does not mean
they are not boiling underground, waiting to erupt. They will always come back to
haunt you. It would be political blindness to ignore the fact that examples of this
abound world-wide."20 In that sense, societies which deliberately ignore the legacy of
past human rights violations such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia leave behind
myths, half- truths, speculations, guilt and denials. These uncertainties create a "thick
wall" between perpetrators and victims. Such a "thick wall" results in a shaky
foundation for a new society because "the beast is not looked in the eye." In order to
"look the beast in the eye" it is important to know the causes of the problem, so as to
deal with the symptoms.21
HI. Prosecutions vs Truth-Telling as Forms of Transitional Justice
There are differing views as to whether the process of national truth and
reconciliation or the prosecution of past human rights violations, is a better form of
justice.22 On the one hand, opponents of prosecution argue that truth-telling is
important because it restores the dignity and respect of victims and their families. It
20Jose Zolaquett in Boraine et al (eds) Dealing with the Past ( 199S) 14-13.
2lKader Asmal "Victims, Survivors and Citizens - Human Rights, Reparations and Reconciliation" (8)
SAJHR (1992) 491 at 494; Kader Asmal et al Reconciliation Through Truth (1995) 9: "The majority
of people in South Africa lived and breathed the truths of apartheid. They suffered the indignities and
humiliation of statutory inferiority. They suffered the pain of being forced out of homes and off their
land; away from their loved ones. They were imprisoned and detained in thousands. They require not
revelations, but acknowledgement from the perpetrators and the beneficiaries.They require a
collective renunciation, by society as a whole, of apartheid's acts, systems and beliefs").
"Regarding discussion on these arguments see generally Juan Mcndez "Accountability for Past
Abuses"(19) Human Rights Quaterly (1997) 255; Neil Kritz (ed) Transitional Justice (vol. 2) (various
scholarly articles deal extensively with these arguments); Naomi Roht -Arriaza (ed) Impunity and
Human Rights in International Law and Practice (1995) (various authors discuss the issue).
also promotes national unity and reconciliation. Most emerging democracies, so the
argument goes, are still fragile, and any attempt to prosecute might jeopardise the
chances of building a new democracy. In the case of South Africa, had the ANC
insisted on prosecution it could have resulted in one of the bloodiest civil wars
imaginable due to the threat posed by the security forces. Lack of tolerance led to a
bloody civil war in the Balkans in 1991. Opponents of prosecution further argue that
the truth revealed through trials is narrow compared to that exposed by a truth
commission. This, however, will depend on the nature of the truth commission since
truth commissions are situation specific. For example, in Uruguay, after a return to
civilian rule, an agreement was reached by passing an amnesty law which provided
that members of the military junta responsible for human rights violations would not
be prosecuted." In Brazil the military junta negotiated a pact with the new
government that there would be no official inquiry into allegations of human rights
abuses during military rule.24 After a general election in Chile in 1983, President Raul
Alfonsin appointed a National Commission on Disappeared Persons to investigate
human rights abuses by the military junta. Although some of the members of the
military junta were prosecuted for gross human rights violations, the commission
could not reveal the truth of what had happened to those who had disappeared." A
common thread of truth commissions in Latin American countries such as Brazil,
Uruguay and Chile is that although some of the members of the military were
" Neil Keitz, supra, Ch. 11.
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prosecuted there was no truth revealed about what had happened to those who
disappeared during the era of military rule.
Opponents of prosecution also contend that prosecution is selective in the sense
that not all perpetrators stand trial. This could be, the argument goes, due to a lack of
sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution. A truth commission may also be selective
because it does not cover all events, but only a certain period in the history of the
conflict.26 Similarly, it is impossible for a prosecutor to indict a suspected criminal
without substantive evidence against him or her. Opponents of prosecution argue that
to make the official report of the truth commission widely available could go a long
way towards healing the nation, because people would know what had happened.
However, if the government does not implement the recommendations of the
commission, such a report could became an "exercise in tokenism."27
Opponents of prosecution believe that a truth-telling mechanism produces a more
powerful message to victims of what happened in the past than criminal prosecution:
"...Collective memory will enable us to see history, to learn from it, and to bring light
and bear witness where darkness and silence reign But by forgetting, a people loses
its character, its spirit, and its most genuine traditions - all the subtle qualities that
make it what it is, and not something else ....We must have the courage not to relegate
that experience to the collective unconscious. We must remember it in order to avoid
falling into the same trap."21
2 6The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) covers a period o f three decades -
from 1960 to 1993, even though apartheid started before 1948.
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Lawrence Weschler in his book A Miracle, A Universe: Setting Accounts with
Xorturers says:
"[T]he broadcasting of the truth to a certain extent redeems the suffering of the
former victims."2'
Proponents of prosecution, on the other hand, proceed from the premise that
impunity undermines the rule of law and that it is an affront to justice. Prosecution,
unlike truth-seeking mechanisms, restores the rule of law. It sends a clear message
that nobody is above the law.30 However, there is also the debate concerning the issue
of prosecuting the "small fish" versus the "big fish."31 For example, General Mladic
and Dr. Rodovan Karadzic, Bosnian Serb leaders believed to be responsible for war
crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are the only "big fishes" out of 75 war criminals
indicted by the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal since 1993 when the court was
established by the United Nations. They contend that failure to prosecute might result
in a lack of confidence and cynicism towards the new democracy, thus undermining
policies of the new government. Failure to prosecute opens the door for the military to
demand immunity thus undermining policies of the new government. Arguably this is
not true, as the experiences of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay prove that it is the
demand for immunity that leads to non-prosecution. In South Africa, members of the
security forces demanded that amnesty be included in the constitution to protect them
from prosecution after a newly democratic government took over in 1994.
"(1990) 245.
10
 See Luc Huste "Justice After Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in
Dealing with the Past" (1) Law & Society Inquiry (1995) 20.
11
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Opponents of non-prosecution also base their argument on the theory of
deterrence - i.e., that punishment deters potential human rights violators. There seems
to be little evidence which supports the proposition that deterrence is effective in
preventing subsequent human rights violations." For example, evidence to prove that
the death penalty deters potential murderers is lacking. Deterrence as a justification
for the imposition of the death penalty was rejected by the Constitutional Court of
South Africa in its landmark decision of S v Makwanyane." The statutes of the two
ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda forbid the imposition of the
death penalty.
Proponents of prosecution argue that trials single out perpetrators and thus avoid
collective guilt of crimes committed by individuals and not nations. They remove the
stigma that a certain group in society is responsible for human rights violations, as is
the case in holding Germans responsible for the Holocaust, Serbs for atrocities
committed in Bosnia or Turks for the Armenian genocide. The separation of collective
guilt from individual guilt argument is not unique in the case of prosecution. Such an
argument applies equally in the case of a truth commission. By "naming names" of
those responsible for past human rights violations a truth commission separates
individual guilt from collective guilt. The South African Truth Commission in its
final report found political leaders of both the apartheid government such as former
32
 See Aryeh Neier "What Should be done about the Guilt?" The New York Review of Books, 1 February
1997, 3 2 : 35 ("I d o not c la im that acknowledging and disclosing the truth about past abuses, or
punishing those responsible for abuses, will necessarily deter future abuses. I doubt there is decis ive
evidence for this proposition").
33
 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).
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State President, PW Botha and liberation movements such as Winnie Madikizela-
Mandela responsible for violations of human rights.34
Factors such as the length of operation, powers and the availability of resources,
contribute towards the success or failure of either a truth commission or prosecution
as mechanisms used to achieve peace and justice in transitional societies. The
advantage of a truth commission, though, is that it has a limited lifespan and its
mandate is specific, unlike trials, which take a relatively long time. Information is
gathered from a wide variety of sources. The first trial of the 1CTY, against Dusko
Tadic, the Bosnian Serb guard at the notorious Ormaska concentration camp in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, has not been completed yet, having begun in 1994."
Both a truth-telling mechanism and prosecution have strengths and weaknesses.
However, the advantage of a truth commission is that it may be "therapeutic or
"cathartic" in nature, unlike prosecution, which regards the victim as a witness
only.16 The victim is thus not treated with dignity and respect. Depending on a
particular legal system, evidence assembled by the prosecutor or the court is often
subject to strict rules of evidence. In certain instances cases are thrown out of court
because of technical legal errors, perhaps relating to the admissibility of a particular
piece of evidence. The case of General Magnus Malan and ten other security officers
charged in connection with a massacre committed in 1987 in Kwa-Makhutha,
"Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 5, Ch. 6.
"Prosecutor's Appeal Brief, dated 15 February 1998.
"Lirieka Meintjies-Van der Walt" Towards Victims' Empowerment Strategies in the Criminal Justice
Process" ( l l )5 / (C/ ( 1998) 157.
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Kwazulu-Natal ("the Kwa-Makhutha triaF') is an example of the failure of criminal
prosecution. After many months of leading evidence against them, the case was
dismissed because the judge found no grounds to pass a sentence of guilt. The case
yielded very little, if anything, for the prosecution and victims. However, there are
instances where prosecution can yield better results, such as the trial of Vlakplaas
Commander, Eugene De Kock, charged with more than two hundred counts of
murder, arson and other criminal activities.11 It is one of the success stories of
criminal prosecution, where evidence properly examined gave rise to an
incontestable verdict.
The success and value of either a truth commission or prosecution will depend on
the historical circumstances of each case. Where a truth commission is utilised,
victims and perpetrators shed light on what has happened within a short space of
time, which many criminal prosecutions do not seem to do. A truth commission like
the TRC can publicly expose the truth, and may bring acknowledgement on the part
of the victim. In that context, restorative justice in the form of a truth commission
offers more advantages than prosecution. I now turn to evaluate these arguments in
light of the work of the TRC and the ICTY.
IV. The TRC and ICTY Compared
The decision to prosecute war criminals and perpetrators of gross human rights
violations or grant them amnesty in return for the truth has confronted many societies
" S v De Kock 1995(3) BCLR 385 (T); Cf. Eugene De Kock A Long Night S Damage: Working for the
Apartheid State (1998) (as told by Jeremy Gordin).
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since World War Two." However, history and circumstances differ. In South Africa,
when the National Party took over power in 1948, they began a system of social
engineering by creating ethnic homelands falsely based on the idea of self-
determination. Ethnic homelands were not based on distinct nations and nationalities,
but on the concept of "divide and rule." Yugoslavia on the other hand was based on
the ideas of "divide and quiet" and "brotherhood and unity."19 The "divide and quiet"
principle together with the principle of "national unity and brotherhood" were the
characteristic features of the 1974 Yugoslav constitution which gave autonomy to the
Serbian provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The "divide and quiet" principle
repeated itself in the Vance-Owen Plan which sought to create cantons for each ethnic
minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These ideals appeared to have been cosmetic or
elitist rather than real, either because of political expediency or gradual erosion over
time. Ethnic hatred has bedevilled the Balkan nations for more than six hundred years.
Petra Ramet in her study on the Yugoslav conflict remarked:
"The past has never been laid to rest in Yugoslavia....historical memory is quite
short, peoples in the Balkans still talk about events in 1389, 14S9, 1921, 1941,
1948,1970 -1971, as if they were fresh. The wounds of the past have never
healed. In a recent illustration of the way the past haunts the present, tens of
thousands of anti-Communist demonstrators assembled on 27 March 1991, to mark
the fiftieth anniversary of the military coup that overthrew a pro-Nazi Serbian and
to draw a parallel with the present Serbian regime, which many accuse of
'fascism'...For Yugoslavs, World War Two seems never to have ended...These
different memories, set atop unhealed wounds, provided the seedbed for deep
bitterness, resentments, and recurrent desires for revenge"40
"Cited in Richard Goldstone "Justice as a Tool for Peacemaking: Truth Commissions and
International Criminal Tribunals" Hauser Lecture, New York University, 22 January 1997 (on file
with the author).
"Zoran Pajic "Bosnia-Herzegovina: From Multi-Ethnic Co-Exislence to 'Apartheid' ..and Back" in
Akhavan Payam & Robert Howse (eds) Yugoslavia the Former and Future: Reflections by Scholars
from the Region (1995) 156.
40
 Petra Ramet Balkan Rebel (1996) 40-41.
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In contrast, the homelands system of "divide and rule" was based on a false idea of
"balkanisation." It is oppression and not "ethnic hatred" which characterised the South
African society, resulting in enormous economic disparity between whites and people
of colour.41
Negotiators of the TRC and drafters of the ICTY were looking over their shoulders
at previous truth commissions and international criminal tribunals. In the case of
South Africa, negotiators in Kempton Park did not opt for a Nuremberg style of
justice. First, there was no victor and vanquished. Second, negotiators were acutely
aware of the potential danger posed by the security forces, who demanded blanket
amnesty for human rights violations committed during the apartheid era, a problem
which faced many of the Latin American countries where the military made similar
demands for atrocities committed during the military era. Thirdly, after several
commissions of inquiries such as the Goldstone and Harms commissions of inquiry
and the Malan trial, it became clear that seeking the truth through the criminal justice
system was not the best option. There was a realisation that without the truth,
acknowledgement, reconciliation and the "reconstruction of society," the new South
Africa would "hobble" rather than "walk" into the future.42 It was due to these
considerations that amnesty had to be counterbalanced with reparations and the truth.
Amnesty was therefore a price to be paid for a peaceful transition.
" See for example, Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas Within the
Union of South Africa (Tomlinson Commission) 19SS; Francis Wilson & Mamphela Ramphela
Uprooting Poverty: The Second Carnegie Enquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa
(1989), and — Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa- An Analysis Prepared for the Office of the
Reconstruction and Development (RDP) by the World Bank on the living standard in South Africa,
October 1995. According to the survey 95% of South Africa's poor are Africans, 5% Coloured, 1%
Indians and Whites.
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In the former Yugoslavia, political leaders advocated ethnic nationalism and there
was no attempt by the political elite to "bridge the gap" of the past. As a result of
selfish political ends, characterised by mistrust, ethnic hatred and propaganda, the
"divide" became wider and wider. The failure on the part of the political elite to face
their past led the international community to impose an external form of transitional
justice. The creation of the ICTY was a decision of the Security Council purporting to
be acting in terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to maintain peace and stability.
However, the international community did not want to repeat the mistakes of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals. For example, the Tribunal strives to be
representative of the international community in terms of the composition of its staff
members and judges drawn from Africa, Asia, England and the USA.
The TRC is a domestic tribunal with no power to prosecute. The TRC was created
by domestic political actors as part of an orderly transition. Although the TRC is sui
generis, it continues to work in parallel with the domestic criminal court systems. The
ICTY, on the other hand, is an international criminal tribunal with power to
prosecute. The ICTY is an external body created by foreign political powers after the
collapse of Yugoslavia. Although the ICTY enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with
national courts it enjoys primacy over the latter. The ICTY can at any time during the
proceedings request national courts in the former Yugoslavia to defer to the
jurisdiction to the ICTY. Although the TRC has some degree of domestic legitimacy."
" See AZAPOand Others v 7»e President of South Africa and Others 1996 (6) BCLR 1015 (CC).
" Richard Wilson "Manufacturing Legitimacy- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the
Rule of Law" (13) Indicator South Africa (199S) 41.
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the ICTY has a low degree of domestic legitimacy amongst the people of the Balkans,
but high international legitimacy.44
(0 Purpose and Object
The primary objective of the TRC is to bring national truth and reconciliation in a
"deeply divided society" by allowing perpetrators to give a full account of what
happened during the dark days of apartheid.41 The primary objective of the ICTY , on
the other hand is "to put an end to...crimes" by taking "effective measures to bring to
justice" persons individually responsible for committing crimes against humanity,
with the hope of contributing to the "restoration and maintenance of peace" and to
deter potential criminals in future.46
The ICTY has the power to prosecute individual war criminals, and states are under
an obligation to co-operate with the Tribunal. The primacy of the ICTY ensures that
there is impartiality and a fair trial for those accused of committing war crimes.
Unlike the TRC, the ICTY has the power to indict, prosecute and issue binding
orders against recalcitrant states refusing to co-operate with the Tribunal. The ICTY
ensures that there is impartiality and a fair trial for those accused of committing war
crimes thus it has indicted Croats, Serbs and Muslims alleged to be responsible for
" Akhavan Payam " Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia: A Commentary on the
United Nations War Crimes Tribunal" (20) Human Rights Quarterly (1998) 49. -
"Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 35 of 199S (as amended) Section I.
"UN Security Council Resolutions 808 & 827 reprinted in the United Nations International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Basic Documents (1995) (emphasis added).
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war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. In 1997 about 10 Croats accused of war crimes
handed themselves over to the Tribunal. This is indeed a positive sign, because the
accused believe they can receive a fair trial, rather than going through a criminal
justice system suffering from legitimacy crises.47 Although the ICTY has no police
force to enforce its decisions, the President of the ICTY has the power to report a
recalcitrant state to the Security Council, which may take appropriate action such as
imposing sanctions against such a state. Sanctions have been imposed against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and the Bosnian-Serb
administration in Pale for failing to co-operate with the Tribunal. Investigators have
been sent by the ICTY in countries such as Canada, Germany, Australia to carry out
investigations. This is possible because the tribunal has resources to conduct such
investigations, something most national courts cannot do due to lack of resources.
However, investigators continue to experience problems of non-co-operation from
national authorities especially in Croatia and Serbia and this affects the work of the
ICTY.
The domestic nature of the TRC ensures that ordinary people "own the process"
because it is locally-based and commissioners undertake visits, and dissemination of
information about the existence of the TRC has been widely disseminated to the
general public through the mass media.48 The advantage of the TRC is that, despite the
fact that is has been staffed by South African nationals, commissioners are expected to
be "politically neutral" because political partisanship will damage the credibility of the
"Address by the President of the ICTY, Gabrielle Kirk Mcdonald, to the United Nations General
Assembly, 2 October 1998. htpp:www. un.org.icty.
41
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 1, Ch.. 2.
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commission in the eyes of the South African public. The ICTY, on the other hand, is
an elite institution far removed from the people it is intended to serve (forum delict
commissi) and thus not convenient for the people in the Balkans (forum
conveniences).''' Even if ordinary people know about its existence, they may tend to
be sceptical because of its foreign nature. In November 1998 the President of the
ICTY, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald initiated an outreach project in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia in an attempt to build a relationship between
the Tribunal and the people of the former Yugoslavia.30
V. Justice, Peace and Reconciliation: Are they Mutually
Exclusive?
(i) The Deterrence Theory
One of the justifications for the creation of the ICTY is to deter potential future war
criminals and to send an unequivocal message that their actions will never go
unpunished." After the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings, war broke out in
Vietnam, Korea, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. A litany of crimes committed in
these regions went unpunished. However, as Bernard Meltzer, says "[tjhese incidents
... have been high enough to raise questions about Nuremberg's deterrent effect.""
" The same applies to the Rwanda tribunal were the seat of the court is in Arusha, Tanzania, the
Office of the public Prosecutor is in Kigali and the Appeal's Chamber is in the Hague, Netherlands.
Antonio Cassese, supra.
!
° Remarks by Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald on the Occasion of Receiving the ABA CEELI
Leadership Award, United Slates Supreme Court, Washington D.C., Monday, 5 April 1999.
Http://www.un.org.icty.
" UN Resolution 808 & 827.
"Bernard Meltzer "Nuremberg and the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal" (30) Valpraiso University Law
Review (1996) 904.
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Meltzer is quick to acknowledge that "Nuremberg may, of course, have helped to keep
the level of war crimes down, but [it] did not completely deter violations of war
crimes."53 Despite the setting up of the ICTY in 1993, war continued unabated in the
Balkan region. The then President of the ICTY, Antonio Cassese, explained to the UN
General Assembly that the Dayton Peace Accord "remained a dead letter."54 In recent
months, the international community has witnessed increased conflict between ethnic
Albanians and Serbian forces in the Serbian Province of Kosovo. It is estimated that
more than 250 people have already been killed in the confrontation between the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbian forces. In 1998 Richard Holbrooke,
US envoy, predicted that the situation "could escalate into something worse than
Bosnia before Dayton."55 It is estimated that more than 15 000 Albanians have left
Kosovo.56 The Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, having sparked the conflict in
Yugoslavia, continues to engage in acts of genocide against the ethnic Albanians.
These incidents place a question mark over the effectiveness of the ICTY's deterrent
influence.
How will the TRC ensure that human rights abuses do not occur in future? It
cannot be argued with certainty that telling the truth will deter future abuses, but
"Ibid.
" Address by Antonio Cassese, President of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former
Yugoslavia to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 19 November 1996 at p. 2.
""Milosevic and Kosovo Leader to Meet" International Herald Tribune, 13 May 1998 p. 6.
"Chris Hedges "Nationalism Begins to Divide Macedonia ,Too" International Herald Tribune, 12 May
1998, p. 8.
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rather that to some extent it redeems the suffering of victims." The experience of the
TRC, through its public proceedings, showed the international community and the
South African public the potency of the shame of apartheid and its ruthless brutality.
Those involved in the atrocities of apartheid voluntarily applied for amnesty, without
coercive measures, and appeared before the Commission and confessed their brutal
actions. The granting of amnesty was not automatic as they were expected to make
full disclosure for actions for which amnesty was being sought. Although the
Commission did not recommend lustration law or purging of perpetrators of gross
human rights violations those who did not apply for amnesty will be prosecuted by the
National Director of Public Prosecution." The Commission has also recommended
that there is a need to transform institutions such as the judiciary, health sector and
police service, which have been tainted as partisan and biased in the past, to ensure
stability and peace.59 It is through the transformation of such structures that abuses of
human rights can be prevented in future.
VI. The Minimum Standard for Transitional Justice
(i) The Link Between Peace and Justice
Peace and justice are inextricably linked. However, an obsession with justice may
equally undermine peace and stability, especially in a society in transition. Justice is
not prescriptive. It can also be achieved through other means - such as a truth
commission. The importance of a truth-telling mechanism is that it can expose the
"Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 5, Ch. 6.
"Ibid, Vol. 5, Ch. 8, para 14.
"Ibid.
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truth and brings acknowledgement on the part of victims, depending, of course, on the
specific truth commission.60
The means used to achieve justice and peace must also enjoy credibility and
legitimacy." For example, some critics have questioned the Dayton Peace Accord as a
basis for peace and justice in the Balkans.62 According to these critics, how could
political leaders such as Slobodan Milosovic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia
be part of an agreement when they had a direct hand in the Yugoslav conflict? How
does one expect them to co-operate with the ICTY, which may in future indict them
for war crimes? Indeed, it is not possible for them to act as players (warlords) and
referees (peacemakers) at the same time.
The Security Council, in creating the ICTY in terms of Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, made a link between peace and justice. In his opening statement, Grant
Niemann, Deputy Prosecutor in the Tadic trial, said:
"This Tribunal has been created not only to administer justice in respect of the
accused that stands before you, but there is an expectation that in so doing you will
contribute to a lasting peace in the country that was once Yugoslavia." "
Although the Security Council saw the ICTY as an important ingredient to
"contribute to a lasting peace" in the Balkans, the ICTY was created at a time when
u l l is important to note that this will depend on the specific truth commission because some truth
commission s such as those in Latin America arguably got justice and not the truth. See generally
discussions in Neil Keitz (ed) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former
Regimes (Country Studies) (Vol. 2).
*' Hendrik van der Merwe Pursuing Justice and Peace in South Africa (1989) 115.
a
 Anthony D'Amato "Peace vs Accountability in Bosnia" (88) American Journal of International Law
(1994)500.
"'Opening Statement by Deputy Prosecutor, Grant Niemann, 7 May 1996 (emphasis added).
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war was still continuing in Yugoslavia. After the ICTY was set up, it encountered
serious problems such as the failure of Serbia and Bosnian Serbs to co-operate and
execute warrant of arrests issued by the tribunal. How can the Tribunal "contribute to
a lasting peace" in the Balkans under such circumstances? As the then ICTY President
Antonio Cassese said in his address to the UN General Assembly, "the Dayton Peace
Accord is a dead letter."*4 The failure of the Dayton Peace Accord can be attribuHed to
the fact that it was not founded on the nexus betweeen peace and justice. External
political powers with their "fumbling diplomacy" were eager to do too many things at
the same time, namely, to bring peace and punish war criminals - a kind of a
"potpourri solution."
In South Africa, political leaders played a constructive role in the process and had
the political will to bring about a peaceful solution in the country. However, the
benefits of peace founded on justice in order to ensure stability, respect for the rule of
law and democracy have yet to be tested.
C\\\ Individual Criminal Responsibility
One of the purposes of punishment for crimes against humanity lies in the
stigmatisation not only to the criminal conduct of the individual perpetrator, but also
to a given society.65 The concept of stigmatisation of individual criminal responsibility
is intended to avoid guilt being ascribed to the whole nation. In that context the
international community expresses its indignation over heinous crimes through public
"Supra.
61
 The International Criminal Tribunal far the former Yugoslavia Yearbook (1996) 90.
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reprobation and the stigmatisation of such offences. In that way it absolves the nation
and denounces the individual perpetrator for his actions.
Justice Richard Goldstone, former Prosecutor of the ICTY, drew a parallel between
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the ICTY regarding the
"personalised" rather than the "collective" guilt approach:
"...When one looks at the emotive photographs of the accused in the dock at
Nuremberg one sees a group of criminals. One does not see a group representative
of the Germans - the people who produced Goethe or Heine or Beethoven. The
Nuremberg Trials were a meaningful instrument for avoiding the guilt of the Nazi's
being ascribed to the whole German people." "
Indeed, it is not the Germans, but Hitler's Ustasha regime which was responsible
for the Holocaust. Similarly is not the Serbs who are responsible for atrocities
committed against Bosnian Muslims and Croats, but warlords such as General Mladic
and Dr. Rodavan Karadzic who should be held individually responsible for war crimes
committed against Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the same way, too,
it is not all White South African who are responsible for apartheid, but political
leaders named in the TRC report. As Michael Ignatief puts it, "war crime
trials...unburden a people of the fiction of collective guilt, by helping them to
transform guilt into shame.""
"Richard Goldstone " 50 Years after Nuremburg: A New International Criminal Tribunal for Human
Rights" in John Christopher (ed) Contemporary Genocides: Causes. Cases, Consequences (1996) 215-
216.
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(iii) Reconciliation cannot he founded on lies
National unity and reconciliation is a long term process. As the postamble of the
interim constitution reminds us, reconciliation is the beginning of "a new chapter in
the history of our country." Although the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission found the reconciliation process a complex issue, it emphasised that it
was a crucial element of a restorative model of justice." In order for reconciliation to
become a reality in South Africa the Commission recommended that the President call
a National Summit of Reconciliation to facilitate the reconciliation process.6' It is my
view (hat there is still a need for some form of a truth commission for the Balkans,
to reduce the lies about the Balkan war and to open a new chapter in the history of
Yugoslavia.7" A pre-condition for the success of such a truth commission is that it
must be spearheaded by the Balkan people. The ICTY, despite its effort and vision
for reconciliation in the Balkans, cannot fulfil the "therapeutic catharsis" of a truth
commission. Rather, its work could be the basis for the establishment of such a truth
commission.
Moral truth has a more powerful message than factual truth and thus brings
acknowledgement on the part of victims." Prosecutions are not the only form in
which justice can be realised. A truth commission can go a long way towards laying
61
 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report Vol. 1, Ch. 5 paras 80-100.
" Ibid, Vol 5,Ch.8.
70
 Richard Goldstone "Crisis in the Balkans nneed its own Version o f the TRC" Sunday Times, 4 April
1999 p. 17.
71
 Richard Goldstone "Exposing Human Rights Abuses - A Help or Hindrance to Reconciliation?" (22)
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly ( 1993)607 at 61S.
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the foundation for reconciliation amongst communities in the Balkans.72 The purpose
and function of a truth commission in general is to reduce lies about past atrocities in
order to avoid subsequent denials. In the words of Michael Ignatief, the past is not a
"sacred text which has been vandalised by evil men and which can be recovered and
returned to a well-lit glass," rather, "the function of truth commissions, like the
function of honest historians, is simplify to purify the argument, to narrow the range
of permissible lies."73 Therefore, a truth commission not only helps "to narrow the
range of permissible lies" about the nature and extent of past atrocities, but also in so
doing narrow the range of the truth revealed.
In the Balkans there is no single version of the truth about atrocities committed in
1991. There are still "claims and counter claims" regarding the true facts of what
happened. In the Balkans, the truth is a victim, rather than a means to unpack the past.
This is well illustrated by President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia who in 1986 wrote a
book, Myths of Historical Realities, in which he argued that the number of Jews,
Serbs and Gypsies who died in the notorious concentration camp, Jasenovac, is
exaggerated. Likewise, failure on the part of apartheid leaders to take moral
responsibility for atrocities committed during that era does not augur well for
reconciliation in this country.
The advantage of the TRC, though, is that it is a win-win situation for both victims
and perpetrators because it "puts everybody on the map." Neither the TRC nor the
72
 "Can Bosnia Learn from Chile and South Africa" Democracy Forum (1996) 44 - 51.
71
 Michael Ignatief "Articles of Faith" (5) Index on Censorship (1996) 111 at 113.
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ICTY are perfect institutions, but have profited from the experiences of previous
similar institutions.
(iv) Recording history so as to avoid subsequent denials
The exhumations in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the War Crimes Tribunal are a clear
testimony to war crimes committed by Serbian leaders. The chairperson of the TRC,
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, when asked whether his Commission has uncovered the
truth about apartheid's dark past was apt to respond "[a]fler many post-mortems,
judicial inquiries, inquests, etc, which failed spectacularly to solve the riddles, we now
know through our amnesty process what precisely happened to Steve Biko, to the
Cradock Four, to Stanza Bopape, to the Pebco Three and others, because the
perpetrators told us."74
(v) Compensation
Another important component of restorative justice is that the offender pays
reparation to "redress" the wrong committed against the victim. Many human rights
conventions provide for the right of victims to claim "redress" without providing a
reasonably clear mechanism of how such a "redress" is to be achieved." Conventions,
unlike treaties, are not binding on state parties and therefore not enforceable. For
" Desmond Tutu " The TRC has Helped lay Foundations for True Reconciliation" Cape Times, 4
August 1998 at p. 4.
"For example, UN Declaration of Human Rights (Article 8); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Article 2 (3); Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (Article 19); ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries (Article 15 (2); Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Article 14); African Charter on Human and People's Rights
(Article 7( 1); American Convention on Human Rights (Article 25(1) Cf. The Study Concerning the
Right to Restitution. Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freeedoms E/CN. 4sub.2 1993/8 at 131-136.
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example, it was only this century, after a lobby by victims movements around the
world, that the United Nations passed the Declaration of Basic Principles of Crime
and Abuse of Power in 1985, specifically to recognise victims' rights to claim
compensation.76 The Declaration states that:
"Informal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, including mediation, arbitration
and customary justice or indigenous practices, should be utilised where
appropriate to facilitate...redress for victims.""
Shortly after the adoption of this convention by the UN General Assembly, the
Council of Europe adopted Council of Europe Resolution No. R(84) in which the
Council recognised that "...it must be a fundamental function of a [ national ] criminal
justice system to meet the needs of and to safeguard the victim" by ensuring payment
of reparations.78 The statute of the Permanent International Criminal Court (PICC)
provides for the creation of a trust fund in order to pay reparations to victims of war
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act80 does not provide a quid
pro quo mechanism for the expungement of victims' rights to institute civil and
criminal action against perpetrators. Moreover, the President has wide powers to
"determine the basis and conditions upon which reparations shall be granted"8' ,thus
"GA 40/ 34, November 1995.
" Article 7.
" Ekkehart Muller-Rappard " Perspectives on the Council of Europe's Approach to the Issue of Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime" (12) Human Rights Quarterly (1990) 231.
"Articles 74 & 79 of the Rome Statute.
M
 Act 34 of 1995.
"Section 27(3) (a)(i).
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giving the executive wide discretionary powers to terminate the reparation scheme
whenever it deems ill this places victims ignorant of the law in a vulnerable situation.
The offender gets amnesty and is not expected to contribute to the reparation of the
victim. However, to require perpetrators to contribute to the compensation scheme
may create problems especially for those offenders who are indigent. This leaves the
state with the only alternative to oversee the reparation process itself." Similarly, the
ICTY Rule 106 (B), providing that after the accused has been found guilty, victims
can claim damages through "relevant national legislation" by bringing a civil action in
a national court, places victims in a difficult, if not an impossible position." Under
such circumstances, the likelihood is that victims would be reluctant to claim
compensation. Benjamin Frencz says:
"[experience has shown that criminal sanctions, particularly if deemed inadequate,
offer little solace and no assistance to the survivors. If justice is to be done a more
constructive alternative must be found. The payment of pecuniary damages by
the offender is possible but not practicable. If the offender acted as the apparent
agent of his government and with no malice of his own, it ought to be the duty of
the State to redress the injury inflicted....therefore., an organised program to
compensate those who have been the victims of war crimes or crimes against
humanity is worthy of serious consideration.""
In 1991, after the Persian Gulf War, the Security Council passed Resolution 687 in
which it ordered the Iraqi government to establish a Compensation Commission for
war victims in Kuwait. Unfortunately, such a commission was never created by the
Iraqi government." The International Conference for the Protection of War Victims,
"Lirieka Meintjies-Van der Walt" Towards Victims' Empowerment Strategies in the Criminal
Justice Process" (11) SACJ(l99t) 1S7 at 162.
"The ICTY has not made any ruling on this issue.
" Benjamin Ferencz "Compensating Victims of the Crimes of War" (12) Virginia Journal of
International Law (1992) 343-344.
"S/ Res/687 (1991).
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held under the auspices of the International Red Cross in Geneva in September 1993,
identified the following problems with regard to the claiming of reparations by
victims:
"(i) Application for reparations or compensation via the state often makes the
process and its outcome uncertain.
(ii) The distinction between damages arising from violation of the right to engage in
warfare (jus ad bellum) and those breaches of international humanitarian law (jus in
bello) dilutes the responsibility to make reparation.
(iii) The obligation to pay reparation only arises where there is an international
armed conflict, and where the conflict is internal it is usually national courts which
should enable victims to claim compensation, but often fail to fulfil that
obligation."86
What is the workable or feasible solution in dealing with compensation in light of
the defects highlighted? It is suggested that an independent claims commission for
victims of war in the former Yugoslavia would be an appropriate forum to deal with
claims for compensation by war victims in the Balkans. It should be a temporary
body attached to the criminal justice system. Such an independent body would
adjudicate claims of victims commencing from 1991 onwards, similar to the ICTY
jurisdiction.87 An independent claims commission for the Balkans would be
appropriate in the circumstances because it would be seen as impartial by victims of
all ethnic groups. In the case of the TRC it is not clear how reparation will be dealt
with by the government. In my view, perpetrators should be required to contribute
towards the reparations funds recommended in the TRC final report. Independent
structures of democracy such as the Human Rights Commission could be utilised to
assist the government in dealing with compensation of victims. It is also important to
" International Conference of War Victims, Geneva, 30 August -1 September 1993, organised by the
International Committee of the Red Cross at p. 438.
" Erik Siesby "An International Court of Civil Claims from Criminal Act Committed during the War
in the Fotmer Yugoslavia" Helsinki Monitor No. 1 (1995) 56.
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have representation from NGO's and victims' organisations. Legal aid and
educational programmes should be carefully utilised to ensure that victims, most of
whom are ignorant of their rights, would be able to claim compensation."
VII. Lessons Learned
Based on the work of the ICTY and TRC, which have learnt from other domestic
truth commissions and international criminal tribunals, certain minimum standards for
transitional justice can be identified. Firstly, although justice is not prescriptive, a
peace process which is not founded on justice is likely to fail such as the Arusha and
Dayton Peace Accords. Although there was disagreement regarding the policy
adopted by the Security Council in creating the ICTY, peace and justice were regarded
by the Council as complimentary to one another. The decision by negotiators in
Kempton Park were largely influenced by the nexus between peace and justice.
Secondly, the truth (whether moral or factual) is an important pre-condition for inter-
racial or inter-ethnic reconciliation, especially in societies polarised by ethnic or racial
conflict. Like in South Africa, the truth helps to vindicate "collective guilt" of a
particular group and thereby "individualise" criminal responsibility and thus set the
historical record straight to avoid subsequent denials. Amnesty is one of the issues
which confronts negotiators in transitional societies. The granting of amnesty to
perpetrators of human rights promotes a culture of impunity.89 In South Africa
negotiators managed to balance amnesty in exchange for the truth. Thirdly, reparation
" Theo van Boven, Cees Flinlerman el al (eds) Seminar on the Right to Restitution,
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Maastricht, 11-15 March 1992.
'''United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Report on the Consequences of Impunity UN Doc.
E/CN. 4/1990/13.
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is an important element of transitional justice. The perpetrator should not only be
granted amnesty, but must also contribute towards the rebuilding of society - not as a
punishment, but as an acknowledgement for their wrongful actions. Although legal
enforcement of such a duty may prove to be impossible there is a moral responsibility
on the part of perpetrators to assist in the "reconstruction of society." These minimum
standards which a transitional society cannot ignore are compatible with restorative
justice, which seeks to restore relationships between the victim, the offender and the
community.
X. Conclusions.
The manner of dealing with past human rights violations depends on the socio-
political dynamics of each society. Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that dealing
with past human rights violations serves many purposes, inter alia, the prevention of
recurrence of human rights abuses. Granting amnesties or pardons is often seen as a
necessary requirement for bringing about national unity and reconciliation so that
people of all political persuasions can support a new democratic order; for repairing
the damage caused by a legacy of past human rights violations and for compensating
victims of human rights violations.
As I have tried to show in this paper, that truth revealed through trials is often
narrow. Moreover, due to the adversarial nature of a trial there is a greater chance of
denials and acquittals. Unlike the ICTY, the TRC contributes to reconciliation in a
number of ways. The TRC "un-silences" the past by advancing national truth and
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reconciliation. The TRC , in my view, did not deal with the core of apartheid (such as
security laws, pass laws, Group Areas Act), but attempted to reduce the number of
lies, by establishing an accepted version of atrocities committed in the past.
In the final analysis, it is or still too soon to judge the work of the ICTY and the
TRC. History will judge the ICTY and the TRC, not only by what they do to achieve
peace and justice, but also by their contribution towards healing wounded nations and
nationalities. As Anthony Dworkin says, "[t]he challenge for the [ICTY] is to prove
that international justice can contribute to the creation of lasting peace in the aftermath
of social breakdown. This is important, because there will always be societies that
cannot undertake the process of justice and reconciliation on their own."90 Judge
Antonio Cassese, then President of the ICTY, said "... despite what has been achieved
in the last four years, it would be entirely premature, inappropriate and even risky for
us to speak at this stage of having done justice to the victims of violence in the former
Yugoslavia. The enormity of what we are dealing with is, of course, not atoned for
simply by holding a few trials; we have much more to do before history can fairly
assess whether we have adequately rendered justice in The Hague.""Archbishop
Desmond Tutu, chairperson of the TRC also said "[ I ]n the long term, the success of
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process may well be judged by what
Parliament legislates for victims."92 To conclude, I wish to emphasise the importance
"Anthony Dworkin "The World in Judgement: Do International War Crimes Tribunals Help or
Hinder National Reconciliation?" (5) Index ofCensorship (1996) 137 at 138.
" Address by Antonio Cassese, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 4 November 1997 at p. 3.
" Desmond Tutu " Healing our Land Through Truth" Sunday Times 5 December 1996 at p. 10.
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of heeding George Santayana's words that "those who forget history are bound to
repeat it."
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